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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiff Cordelia Lear (Cordelia) filed an initial action in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Union assert-
ing an uncompensated takings claim against the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS or the Government) and Brittain County (the 
County), and challenging the constitutionality of applying Con-
gress’ Commerce powers under the Endangered Species Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012) (ESA).  R. at 4.1  The district court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) because the issues 
arose “under the Constitution.”  This action is an appeal from a 
final decision and judgment issued by the District Court on June 
1, 2016 awarding Plaintiff damages for an uncompensated taking, 
dismissing the constitutional challenge, and disposing of all par-
ties’ other claims.  R. at 1, 12.  Final decisions from the District 
Court are appropriately under the jurisdiction of this Court for re-
view.  28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Whether Congress’s Commerce power extends through the 
ESA to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that has 
no substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
II. Whether Cordelia’s takings claim is ripe for review without 
applying for an ITP when the cost for the permit application 
alone would exceed the total property value. 
III. Whether a takings analysis of the Cordelia Lot should in-
clude the entirety of Lear Island as the relevant parcel, de-
spite the vesting of Plaintiff’s distinct fee simple absolute 
interest in the ten-acre lot. 
IV. Whether a categorical takings claim based on deprivation 
of economically beneficial use is prevented by the possibility 
 
1. Citations with “R. at __” refer to the Record of the Final Problem, revised 
on November 7, 2016. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/5
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of the natural destruction of the Karner Blue’s habitat in 
ten years. 
V. Whether a takings claim based on no remaining economi-
cally beneficial use is precluded by an offer to pay an annual 
rent totaling less than the cost of yearly property tax on the 
Cordelia Lot. 
VI. Whether public trust principles inhere in Cordelia’s title so 
as to prevent her takings claim resulting from the denial of 
a county wetlands permit. 
VII. Whether FWS or the County can avoid joint liability for a 
takings claim when the Cordelia Lot is left with no econom-
ically beneficial use as a result of the combined regulations. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Fifth Amendment upholds important values of fairness 
and justice by protecting private landowners from bearing an indi-
vidual burden when government intrudes on their property.  The 
type of government intrusion demanding just compensation was 
traditionally physical occupation, regardless of how insignificant, 
and has expanded to include both eminent domain powers and reg-
ulatory powers.  Where an individual property has been subjected 
to regulation that goes too far, leaving a property with no econom-
ically beneficial use, an aggrieved party may bring an action in 
court demanding just compensation.  Here, Cordelia Lear brought 
an action seeking just compensation for the regulatory deprivation 
of any development of her property – a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment that offends public notions of fairness and requires 
just compensation. 
Regulatory takings doctrine has undergone significant trans-
formation over the last century, however, courts have made clear 
that private property rights are a well-protected bedrock of Amer-
ican law.  FWS has asserted regulatory authority through a tenu-
ous and improper application of the Commerce Clause as applied 
to an isolated interstate population of Karner Blue butterflies on 
Lear Island.  The result when combined with the Brittain County 
Wetlands Law completely deprives Cordelia of all economically 
3
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beneficial use of her land.  FWS and Brittain County, by denying 
joint liability, seek to obstruct Cordelia Lear’s Fifth Amendment 
right to just compensation for the actual loss suffered as a result of 
the combined regulations. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Located in Brittain County in the State of New Union, Lear 
Island is a 1,000-acre island near the edge of Lake Union, a large 
interstate lake.  R. at 4.  In 1803, while present-day New Union 
was still a part of the Northwest Territory, Congress granted Lear 
Island and its surrounding submerged lands within 300 feet of the 
shoreline (the Grant) to Cornelius Lear in fee simple absolute.  R. 
at 4, 5.  By 1965, King James Lear had inherited the fee simple 
absolute interest in the entirety of Lear Island.  R. at 4, 5.   
In 1965, the Brittain Town Planning Board approved subdivi-
sion of the property into three lots, and determined that each lot 
could develop at least one single-family residence.  R. at 5.  King 
Lear deeded each of the three lots separately to his daughters, re-
serving a life estate for himself.  Id.  Cordelia Lear took possession 
of her deeded property in 2005 when King Lear died.  Id. 
Lear Island contains the last remaining habitat of the New 
Union subpopulation of Karner Blue Butterfly, a federally listed 
endangered species.  R. at 5.  The FWS designated the Karner Blue 
an endangered species in 1992, and concurrently designated the 
Cordelia Lot as critical habitat.  Id.  Cordelia asserts claims 
against FWS and Brittan County for an uncompensated taking of 
her property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Id. 
The property that is the subject of this action (the Cordelia 
Lot) comprises ten acres of the 1,000-acre Island, not including any 
submerged lands.  R. at 5, n.2.  The Cordelia Lot consists of a 40-
foot by 1000-foot access strip and an open field comprised of nine 
acres of uplands.  Id.  Fronting the lot is about one acre of emergent 
cattail marsh in a cove that was historically open water and used 
as a boat landing (the Cove).  Id.  The Cordelia Lot has been kept 
open by annual mowing each October and is covered by wild blue 
lupine flowers, essential for the survival of the Karner Blue.  Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/5
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In 2012, Cordelia contacted the New Union FWS bureau to in-
quire if development of her property would require any permits due 
to the presence of the Karner Blue.  R. at 6.  FWS advised her that 
the entirety of the Cordelia lot was critical habitat, and “any dis-
turbance” other than annual mowing “would constitute a take” in 
violation of the ESA.  Id. The FWS agent advised Cordelia that in 
order to obtain an ITP under section 10 of the ESA, she would have 
to develop a habitat conservation plan (HCP) and perform an envi-
ronmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy 
Act.  Id.  The FWS further advised in their May 15, 2012 letter that 
an HCP would only be approvable if she provided for contiguous 
lupine habitat within a one-thousand-foot radius of the existing 
fields, and if she committed to maintaining the remaining lupine 
fields through annual mowing.  Id.  Cordelia does not own any sur-
rounding contiguous land, and the neighboring owner has refused 
any cooperation.  Id.  Preparation of an ITP, including the required 
HCP and environmental assessment documents, would cost 
$150,000.  Id.  The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot without 
any restrictions that would prevent development of a single-family 
home is $100,000.  R. at 7. 
Without annual mowing, the Karner Blue habitat could disap-
pear naturally; a process that would take an estimated ten 
years.  R. at 7.  The result would be extinction of the New Union 
subpopulation of Karner Blues.  Id.  Cordelia developed an Alter-
native Development Proposal (ADP) that would not disturb the lu-
pine fields.  Id.  In the ADP, Cordelia proposed filling one half-acre 
of the marsh in the Cove to create a lupine-free building site, to-
gether with an access causeway.  Id.  
No federal approval is required for the ADP because the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers has determined this portion of Lake Un-
ion to be “non-navigable” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, and because construction of residential dwellings in-
volving one half-acre or less are authorized by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers Nationwide Permit 29.  R. at 7.  Pursuant to the 
County Wetlands Law, enacted in 1982, the ADP required a permit 
to fill the cove marsh.  Id.  Cordelia duly filed a permit application 
with the Brittain County Wetlands Board in August 2013.  Id.  In 
December 2013, the County denied Cordelia’s permit application 
on the grounds that permits to fill wetlands would only be granted 
5
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for a water-dependent use, and that a residential home site was 
not a water-dependent use.  R. at 6. 
There is no market in Brittain County for a parcel like the 
Cordelia lot for recreational use without the right to develop a res-
idence on the property, nor does the Cordelia Lot have any market 
as agricultural or timber land.  R. at 7.  Property taxes on the Cor-
delia Lot are $1,500 annually.  Id.  The Brittain County Butterfly 
Society has offered to pay Cordelia $1000 annually to conduct but-
terfly viewings which she declined.  R. at 7. 
In February 2014, Cordelia filed an action in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Union, seeking a declaration 
that the ESA was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional leg-
islative power when applied to a wholly intrastate population, or 
alternatively, just compensation from both the County and FWS 
because the regulations together restrict all economically benefi-
cial use of the land.  Id. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The possible standards of review for a district court opinion 
are de novo, clear error, or abuse of discretion.  See Harman v. Ap-
fel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000).  The standard applied de-
pends on the context of the issues on appeal.  United States v. 
Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).  De novo is the 
appropriate standard for issues predominantly involving interpre-
tation of law, while factual determinations by the District Court 
must be upheld absent clear error.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).  Fur-
thermore, the clear error standard applies to “findings based on 
documentary evidence” in addition to oral testimony.  Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984) (citing 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 541 
(1948)). 
 
 
 
 
 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/5
   
144 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
FWS regulation of the Cordelia Lot under the ESA is an over-
reach of the Commerce Clause, which allows federal regulation of 
commerce between states.  When Congress asserts authority over 
an activity using the Commerce Clause, that activity must be eco-
nomic in nature and have a sufficient effect on interstate com-
merce.  Unlike ESA cases that have upheld Commerce Clause au-
thority, the present case is entirely absent of any interstate 
activity.  Not even tenuous connections such as those of tourism or 
scientific research will take place on the private land of Cordelia 
Lear.  The regulation here goes beyond a mere prohibition on de-
velopment to encompass “any disturbance” of the Karner Blue, ef-
fectively disallowing any use or enjoyment of the lot.  Therefore, 
regulating development on the Cordelia Lot through the Com-
merce Clause is an improper extension of federal authority. 
As a threshold matter, the takings claim currently before this 
Court is ripe for review.  The actions of FWS and the County are 
final, and the absence of any permissible use of the property is 
known to a reasonable degree of certainty.  Additionally, the 
$150,000 cost of pursuing an unattainable ITP is more than the 
value of the Cordelia Lot itself.  Requiring Cordelia to follow such 
strict formality before judicial review becomes available consti-
tutes an undue burden, and is not a necessary step when faced with 
administrative futility.  The Court should find this issue ripe for 
review because the Supreme Court has specifically identified futil-
ity as an exemption to a final decision. 
The ten-acre Cordelia Lot is the relevant parcel for a regula-
tory takings analysis.  King James Lear deeded his fee simple in-
terest in the Lot to Cordelia in 1965, and she was vested with full 
possession and ownership of the Lot in fee simple absolute when 
King Lear passed away in 2005.  The Cordelia Lot is now a distinct 
and separate estate from the neighboring lots.  As such, the ten-
acre lot is the “denominator,” or baseline of value in the takings 
analysis “ratio,” whereby the loss of beneficial use of the property 
is the “numerator.”  Because the severance of the Lear Island Par-
cels was legal and final rather than “conceptual,” there is no basis 
for the assertion that the Lear Island lots should be considered as 
a single parcel. 
7
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The regulations preventing development of the Cordelia Lot 
are permanent, and categorical treatment of the takings claim 
should be upheld.  Unlike the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
temporary building moratoria, the analysis of the present case does 
not leave any future interest remaining in the parcel as a 
whole.  Categorical regulatory takings look only to the interest lost 
at the time property use was restricted.  Moreover, no regulatory 
taking is truly “permanent” because regulations can always be 
changed.  It would be improper to rely on a hypothetical adjust-
ment of the regulation’s current deprivation of all economic use of 
the property, thus the Court should find a categorical taking oc-
curred. 
Additionally, Cordelia’s categorical takings claim is not pre-
cluded by the offer from the Britain County Butterfly Society.  A 
purported economic gain that is less than the expense of property 
tax and actually results in a net loss is per se a non-economically 
viable use.  Furthermore, it is evident that even land so heavily 
regulated as to have no remaining beneficial use still retains some 
value.  Government regulations cannot, within the confines of the 
Fifth Amendment, eviscerate private land rights and leave behind 
only a token value without paying compensation.  This Court 
should affirm Cordelia’s valid categorical takings claim based on a 
complete loss of economically beneficial use. 
Public trust principles do not inhere in Cordelia Lear’s rights 
of ownership and use of the riparian lands fronting the Lot.  In 
1803, Lear Island was granted to Cordelia’s ancestor by the United 
States Congress before the admission of the State of New Un-
ion.  At that time, the U.S. Government had sovereign authority 
over what was then the Northwest Territory.  When Congress 
granted the Island and its surrounding submerged lands to Cor-
nelius Lear in fee simple absolute, the U.S. was divested of its sov-
ereign title over the Grant, and therefore did not convey it to the 
State upon admission to the Union.  Thus, Brittain County has no 
authority to regulate Cordelia’s riparian lands under a public trust 
theory. 
FWS and Brittain County should be held jointly liable for the 
total deprivation of all economically beneficial use of the Cordelia 
Lot.  The Fifth Amendment prohibition on uncompensated taking 
of property is extended to the States (and Counties) by the Four-
teenth Amendment, rendering both FWS and the County generally 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/5
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liable for Fifth Amendment Takings Clause violations.  Regulatory 
takings analysis centers on the loss suffered by landowners, rather 
than the benefits accrued or harms prevented by regulation.  Be-
cause Cordelia was deprived of all economically beneficial use of 
her property, a categorical taking has occurred, and requires just 
compensation equal to the fair market value of the property.  An 
absence of Federal appellate case law either enforcing or barring 
joint agency liability makes this an issue of first impression for a 
Federal Circuit Court.  This Court should avoid potentially injuri-
ous precedents and affirm Fifth Amendment protections against 
uncompensated takings by finding FWS and Brittain County 
jointly liable. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMERCE POWER DOES NOT EXTEND 
TO AN INTRASTATE SPECIES THAT DOES NOT 
AFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
The lower court erred when it found that the ESA is a valid 
exercise of the Congress’ Commerce power, as applied to a wholly 
intrastate population of an endangered butterfly.  People for Ethi-
cal Treatment of Prop. Owners v. United States FWS, 57 F. Supp.3d 
1337, 1343 (D. Ut. 2014).  FWS seeks to regulate activity that is 
noneconomic in nature that has no effect on interstate com-
merce.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding 
the Gun–Free School Zones Act unconstitutional in part because it 
had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enter-
prise); United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).  FWSs 
confirmation to Cordelia that “any disturbance” other than annual 
mowing would constitute a take in violation of the ESA exceeds the 
limits of federal power.  R. at 6; See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 
323 F.3d 1062, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rationalizing that the focus 
is on the activity that the government seeks to regulate).  By plac-
ing limitations on any disturbance, FWS seeks to regulate activity 
with no effect on interstate commerce like that of “a hiker’s casual 
walk in the woods.”  See Rancho Viejo, LLC, 323 F.3d at 1077. 
9
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The District court erroneously found that the relevant activity 
being regulated is the underlying land development through con-
struction of the proposed residence.  The inclusion of the language 
“any disturbance” indicates the impermissible extent of govern-
ment reach.  R. at 8; See GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. V. Norton, 
362 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Rancho Viejo, LLC 323 
F.3D at 1077.  Furthermore, the regulation does not prohibit the 
taking of the Karner Blue for any purpose involving tourism or sci-
entific research.  Gibbs v. Babbitt 214 F.3d 483, 493 (4th Cir. 2000).  
Therefore, this court should reverse the lower court’s holding and 
find that the ESA is not a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce 
Power as applied to the Karner Blue butterfly. 
A. The Karner Blue Population is Completely 
Confined to the Cordelia Lot, and an Extension of 
the Commerce Clause is Unwarranted 
The ESA prohibits the take of any endangered species.  16 
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).  By prohibiting the take of an entirely in-
trastate species, FWS is regulating noneconomic activities such as 
land clearing and vegetation removal that do not involve interstate 
commerce.  R. 8. Congress has authority to regulate the use of in-
terstate commerce, and protect the instrumentalities of, or persons 
or things in, interstate commerce.  People for Ethical Treatment of 
Prop. Owners, 57 F.Supp.3d 1343.  The regulated activity must be 
economic in nature when relying on the substantial aggregate ef-
fects as the basis for regulation under the Commerce power.  Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 561; Morrison 529 U.S. at 617; Mississippi Commission 
on Environmental Quality v. E.P.A., 790 F.3d 138, 182 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (holding ozone pollution has economic consequences on in-
terstate commerce); Allied Local & Regional Manufacturers. Cau-
cus v. U.S. E.P.A., 215 F.3d 61, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (regulating en-
vironmental hazards that have effects in more than one 
state).  The Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to reg-
ulate takes of a “purely intrastate species that has no substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.”  People for Ethical Treatment of 
Prop. Owners, 57 F.Supp.3d at 1346. 
There is a logical stopping point for the court’s rationale in up-
holding the constitutionality of the Commerce power.  In Rancho 
Viejo, the Chief Judge distinguishes large-scale construction of a 
housing development that does affect interstate commerce from the 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/5
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“homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape his property,” 
explaining that although he “takes the toad, that does not affect 
interstate commerce.”  323 F.3d at 1080 (Chief Judge Ginsburg, 
concurring) (emphasis added).  Without this limitation, “any kind 
of activity[]” could be regulated by the government, “regardless [of] 
whether that regulated activity ha[s] any connection with inter-
state commerce.”  Id.  Unlike large scale development projects, dis-
turbance of the Cordelia Lot has no effect on interstate com-
merce.  See id. 
B. The Regulation is Not Necessary to Sustain Any 
Economic Activity 
Regulating the take of an endangered species under the Com-
merce Clause has been upheld when such regulation sustains in-
terstate economic activity.  Gibbs v. Babbitt 214 F.3d at 493.  For 
example, the Commerce Clause can be used to regulate the preser-
vation of a species where scientists and tourists may seek out the 
animal, thus traveling from other states and utilizing interstate 
commerce channels.  Id.  The New Union subpopulation of the Kar-
ner Blue does not affect interstate commerce through any such ac-
tivities, as they exist only on the private land of Cordelia.  Id. at 
494.  Without such a link to economic activity, Congress’ Commerce 
power is not valid.  See id. at 493-95. 
In the instant case, upholding of the commerce clause would 
be a limitless application of federal protection.  See GDF Realty In-
vestments, Ltd. 362 F.3d at 292.  Applying the commerce clause 
here would “convert the ESA to an economic regulatory statute.”  
Id.  The effects of the Karner Blue butterfly on interstate com-
merce are too attenuated to pass constitutional muster.  See id. at 
292 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612). 
II. THE TAKINGS CLAIM IS RIPE BECAUSE 
FURTHER PURSUIT OF A PERMIT WOULD BE 
FUTILE 
The taking of Cordelia’s property occurred when FWS promul-
gated the rule designating her property as critical habitat, pursu-
ant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring that critical 
habitat for an endangered species shall be designated concurrently 
11
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with listing).  57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992).  The FWS con-
firmed this when they advised Cordelia that her “entire ten-acre 
property” was critical habitat and that “any disturbance” would 
constitute a take in violation of the ESA.  R. at 6.  The advisory 
letter of May 15, 2012 constituted a constructive denial of an ITP, 
and provided sufficient information concerning the prohibitive re-
strictions on the Cordelia Lot to constitute a final agency ac-
tion.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001). Any fur-
ther effort towards an already unattainable ITP would also be 
unduly burdensome, therefore causing this claim to be ripe.  See 
Hage v. United States, 35 Fed.Cl. 147, 164 (1996); Robbins v. 
United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 381, 387 (aff’d) (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
A. Cordelia’s Claim is Ripe for Review Because the 
Agency Action Constituted a Final Decision 
Under the ripeness doctrine, courts examine (1) the hardship 
the aggrieved party will suffer from withholding judicial review 
and (2) the fitness of the issue for judicial decision.  Abbott Labor-
atories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).  In the present case, 
FWS and the County have acted through regulatory mechanisms 
to deprive Cordelia all economic use of her property.  This case is 
ripe for review because the denial of development is determinative, 
and without judicial intervention Cordelia will lose all economic 
use of her land.  See id. 
A takings claim is ripe when an “agency charged with imple-
menting the regulation has reached a final decision regarding their 
application to the property at issue.”  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 607 
(citing Williamson County Regional Planning Community v. Ham-
ilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)).  A final de-
cision does not occur until the responsible agency determines the 
extent of permitted development on the land.  MacDonald Sommer 
& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986).  Here, FWS con-
firmed the extent of the permitted development on the land with 
the May 15, 2012 letter stating “any disturbance” other than the 
annual mowing “would constitute a ‘take’” in violation of the 
ESA.  R. at 6.; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618-19.  FWS explained the 
extent of the regulation on the Cordelia Lot with finality, which 
eliminates all beneficial use of the property.  See id. 
The court in Williamson Cty. establishes the two-part test for 
ripeness.  473 U.S. at 186.  The test requires that (1) a landowner 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/5
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obtain a final decision regarding the application of the challenged 
regulations to his property and (2) utilizes any state procedures for 
obtaining just compensation if they are available.  Id. at 190-94.  In 
the present case, the second prong of the Williamson Cty. test is 
inapplicable because the State of New Union does not have a just 
compensation clause, nor does the State have a statute providing 
for a procedure seeking just compensation.  R. at 9, n. 5; see Wil-
liamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194.  The first prong was satisfied when 
FWS effectively reached a final decision regarding the applicability 
of the ESA to the Cordelia Lot, and provided Cordelia with condi-
tions that were impossible to satisfy.  R. at 9; see id. 
In takings claims, the Williamson Cty. finality requirement 
applies to decisions about how a plaintiff’s own land may be used.  
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 
(1997); see Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186.  FWS advised Cor-
delia about conditions that made the ITP unattainable, and con-
firmed that its discretion was exhausted in regards to the use of 
her land.  R. at 9; Id.  Therefore, further pursuit of an ITP is not 
necessary and an application would be futile.  See Suitum, 520 U.S. 
at 739 (1997); Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186.  FWSs conduct 
therefore amounted to a “constructive denial” of the ITP.  R. at 9; 
see Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.   
The District Court correctly held that if procedures to acquire 
a permit are so burdensome to effectively deprive plaintiffs of prop-
erty rights, pursuing a permit is unnecessary.  R. at 9 (citing Hage, 
35 Fed. Cl. at 164).  Requiring Cordelia to replace the lupine field 
with contiguous acreage is not only burdensome but also impossi-
ble because that acreage exists on land she does not own whose 
owner refuses to have restrictions on her property.  R. at 6; see 
Hage, 35. Fed. Cl. at 164.  Moreover, the cost of preparing the per-
mit would be more than the value of the property, with the outcome 
still resulting in a denial.  R. at 6, 7.  Therefore, this Court should 
find the issues ripe for review. 
B. An ITP Application would be Futile Where the 
Permit Necessarily Includes Conditions 
Impossible for Cordelia to Satisfy 
Landowners must pursue avenues to provide relief but they 
are not required to take “patently fruitless measures,” and here, 
an ITP application would be futile.  MacDonald Sommer & Frates, 
13
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477 U.S. at 359; Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 
(1990) (Holding that the futility exception excuses property owners 
from resubmitting proposals to arrive at a final administrative de-
cision); Macdonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7.  Further steps towards the 
ITP will not change whether FWS issues the permit or not, thereby 
making any attempts futile.  R. at 9; see Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d 
at 1501; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1014, n. 3. (1992) (noting that a permit would not be issued, appli-
cation or no application).  Unlike in Robbins, where a permit was 
not sought and the cost was unknown, the cost of mitigation here 
is ascertained to be “economically impractical,” and the conditions 
precedent are deemed impossible to satisfy.  R. at 9; 40 Fed.Cl. at 
388. 
Here, the regulatory taking challenge is ripe because the une-
quivocal nature of the regulations that prohibited Cordelia from 
developing a residence on her property would make an ITP appli-
cation meaningless and akin to a permit denial.  Palazzolo, 533 
U.S. at 619; Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Robbins, 40 Fed.Cl. at 388.  When the per-
missible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of 
certainty and it is clear that the agency lacks discretion to permit 
any development, a takings claim is likely ripe.  Palazzolo, 533 
U.S. at 620.  Development of Cordelia’s property would be imper-
missible as burdened by FWS’s regulation.  See id. 
Defendant’s cite Morris v. United States, in arguing that Cor-
delia’s claim is not ripe, however, in that case, the costs of applying 
for a permit were not known and the plaintiffs’ takings theory was 
not grounded in any agency restriction on the use of their prop-
erty.  R. at 9; Morris v. United States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004).  Unlike the present facts, the agency in Morris had not 
exercised its discretion in a manner that made reasonably clear or 
final the affect the regulation would have on the permit applica-
tion.  392 F.3d at 1378.  The burden on the Cordelia Lot cripples 
all economically beneficial use by prohibiting “any disturbance,” 
and is ripe for judicial review.  R. at 6. 
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III. THE RELEVANT PARCEL FOR TAKINGS 
ANALYSIS IS THE CORDELIA LOT AND NOT THE 
ENTIRETY OF LEAR ISLAND 
The legal and factual circumstances in this case dictate that 
the relevant parcel for a takings claim is the Cordelia Lot.  At the 
time of subdivision, King Lear conveyed each of the three lots to 
his three daughters by deed, but retained for himself a life inter-
est.  R. at 5.  Upon the death of King Lear in 2005, individual and 
distinct fee simple absolute ownership rights to the three Lear Is-
land lots vested respectively in each of his daughters.  Therefore, 
the Cordelia Lot was legally severed from the other two Lear Island 
lots, precluding a compelled re-aggregation of the estates for the 
purposes of a takings analysis. 
A. The Death of King James Lear in 2005 Vested a 
Distinct Fee Simple Ownership Right in Cordelia 
Lear 
Cordelia Lear’s estate of fee simple absolute in the Cordelia lot 
was vested in her upon the expiration of her father’s life estate in 
2005.  Prior to 2005, Cordelia held a vested remainder in her re-
spectively deeded lot because a future interest is vested if it is cer-
tain to take effect in possession or enjoyment.  Restatement (Third) 
of Property § 25.3 (Am. Law Inst. 2011).  Before subdividing the 
Island, King James Lear held a fee simple absolute interest in the 
entirety of Lear Island, handed down from the original 1803 
grantee, Cornelius Lear.  R. at 4, 5.  When King Lear subdivided 
Lear Island in 1965, he “deeded each of the lots, respectively, to his 
three daughters, reserving a life estate in each lot for himself.”  R. 
at 5 (emphasis added).  It was therefore King Lear’s manifest in-
tent that the three lots be held separately, in fee, by his daugh-
ters.  See id.  Thus, when King Lear died in 2005, Cordelia Lear 
came into individual possession and ownership of her 
lot.  Id.  Based on common law principles of succession, and with-
out anything in the record to indicate otherwise, it must be as-
sumed that Cordelia acquired a fee simple absolute interest in her 
lot when her full rights vested. 
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B. The Cordelia Lot Must Be Considered Separately 
from the Other Lear Island Lots for Takings 
Analysis 
Because Cordelia Lear owns a fee simple interest in her ten-
acre lot, distinct from the fee simple interests of her sisters in the 
other two lots, the relevant parcel for the takings claim must be 
the Cordelia lot alone.  For the purpose of determining whether a 
government action constitutes an unconstitutional taking, a court 
must consider the “nature and extent of the interference with 
rights in the parcel as a whole[.]”  Penn. Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978).  The Supreme 
Court has rejected “conceptual severance” arguments designed to 
manufacture takings claims.  See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Coun-
cil v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 
(2002).  However, “conceptual severance” arguments such as that 
in Tahoe-Sierra are sometimes advanced for the purpose of at-
tempting to disaggregate some portion of a combined property in-
terest (in Tahoe-Sierra, a temporal disaggregation) as a distinct in-
terest unto itself.  Id.  Such legal subterfuge, however, is not 
required here. 
The existence of an estate in fee simple absolute, vested with 
the Plaintiff, alleviates the Court’s need to struggle with the “de-
nominator” or “relevant parcel” question in a takings deprivation 
analysis due to the fee simple estate’s “rich tradition of protection 
at common law.”  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).  Determination of whether a regulatory 
taking has occurred requires a comparison between “the value that 
has been taken” from a property and “the value that re-
mains.”  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis 480 U.S. 
470, 497 (1987).  Thus, in the regulatory takings “fraction,” the 
“relevant parcel” furnishes the “denominator,” or the total interest 
in property against which the deprivation of value or use is meas-
ured.  See id.  Cordelia Lear’s interest in her lot is hers alone, and 
she holds no interest in the lots of her sisters.  The severance of 
interest in the Cordelia Lot was manifested in fact by the subdivi-
sion of the Island in 1965, before the existence of the regulatory 
burden, and a formal subdivision of land creates a new group of 
smaller “denominators” out of the larger pre-subdivision “parcel as 
a whole.”  See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 
1171, 1181 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (holding that lands transferred before 
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the creation of the re environment should not be included in the 
denominator). 
C. Brittain County’s Claim that the Relevant Parcel 
is the Entire Island Runs Contrary to Prior 
County Action 
Evidently Defendant Brittain County was aware of and ap-
proved the division of Lear Island into separate lots.  In 1965, the 
Brittain Town Planning Board approved the subdivision of Lear 
Island, and determined that each lot could be developed with at 
least one single family home.  R. at 5.  The subdivision approval 
and zoning determination occurred before King Lear executed the 
three deeds to his daughters.  Id.  Thus, King Lear could just as 
easily have conveyed any or all of the three lots to complete 
strangers if he had so chosen.  Had that been the case, it is doubtful 
that Brittain County or FWS would attempt to claim, as they do 
now, a subsequent re-merging of interests with respect to the three 
lots. 
IV. NO ECONOMICALLY BENEFICIAL USE 
REMAINS IN THE CORDELIA LOT, 
CONSTITUTING A PERMANENT TAKING 
REQUIRING COMPENSATION 
The Supreme Court is clear that when a property owner is 
made to sacrifice “all economically beneficial uses in the name of 
the common good” a taking has occurred.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 
(emphasis in original).  Furthermore, the only appropriate remedy 
to the occurrence of a taking is through compensation.  First Eng-
lish Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987).  The Wetlands Law and the designation of 
the entire Cordelia Lot as critical habitat deny Plaintiff any oppor-
tunity for development.  R. at 6-7.  As the regulations stand, the 
Cordelia Lot has no present or future economically beneficial use 
and the Plaintiff must be compensated.  See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 
at 330 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019). 
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A. A Categorical Taking Accrued When the County 
Denied the ADP and FWS Constructively Denied 
Development on the Cordelia Lot 
The Fifth Amendment protects property owners from govern-
ment invasion by preventing private property from being “taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”  U.S. Const. amend. 
V.  When such an effect is accomplished through regulations that 
“wipe out” any remaining economic use of a property, the regula-
tion is considered to be a per se taking.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-
18.  It has been repeatedly held that when a regulatory takings 
claim arises from the denial of a permit, the appropriate analysis 
of a takings claim is at the time of the denial.  See United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985); Whit-
ney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1171-73 (Fed. 
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that a taking occurs when economic devel-
opment is prevented). 
In the present case, the County denial and FWS action 
through issuance of the May 15, 2012 letter prevent all develop-
ment or use of the Cordelia Lot.  R. at 6; Whitney, 926 F.2d at 1171-
73.  Subsequent events that occur after the fact – if they occur at 
all – do not change the interests that were taken from an owner at 
the time a regulation takes effect.  Whitney, 926 F.2d at 1172-
73.  Put another way, determining whether the denial effectuated 
a categorical taking depends “only on the effect of that particular 
denial on plaintiffs’ property interests at the time of the de-
nial.”  Resource Investments, Inc., and Land Recovery, Inc. v. 
United States, 85 Fed.Cl. 447, 484 (2009) (emphasis in original). 
A takings claim that may be cut short, whether by conse-
quence of legislative amendment or otherwise, does not have the 
effect of diminishing what was initially taken.  See Tahoe-Sierra, 
535 U.S. at 327-28.  The Tahoe-Sierra Court in fact quoted Justice 
Brennan that “the government must pay just compensation for the 
period commencing on the date which the regulation first effected 
a ‘taking,’” which was later endorsed in First English.  Id. at 328 
(quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 
(1981)).  Put simply, “the valuation of property which has been 
taken must be calculated as of the time of the taking.”  First Eng-
lish, 482 U.S. at 320.   
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Here, Defendants advance a position based on the hypothetical 
extinction of the species which the FWS regulations seek to pro-
tect.  R. at 7.  It is improper for a court to look beyond acts of cer-
tainty and instead rely only on mere possibility when determining 
the value of what was taken.  See First English, 482 U.S. at 320; 
Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County, VA v. 
United States, 276 F.3d at 1359, 1365 (2002) (noting any consider-
ation of proposed land uses must be identifiable and be probable to 
occur in the “reasonably near future.”) (emphasis added).  Thus, 
any decision regarding Cordelia’s categorical taking must look di-
rectly at the loss she suffered at the time, and not towards specu-
lation.  See United States ex rel and for Use of Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 276 (1943) (finding in condem-
nation suit that future land use cannot be “too remote and specu-
lative to have any legitimate effect upon the valuation.”). 
B. No Present or Future Economically Beneficial Use 
Remains in the Cordelia Lot 
The majority in Tahoe-Sierra emphasized that application of 
the categorical takings rule is still appropriate when there is a to-
tal taking of the parcel as a whole.  535 U.S. at 329-32.  There, the 
Court excluded from categorical treatment only properties in 
which a landowner retained some economically beneficial use in 
the future.  Id.  Thus, whether a permit denial constitutes a cate-
gorical taking of the parcel as a whole turns on future economically 
viable use in the parcel as a whole.  Id. 
The landowners in Tahoe-Sierra never faced a permanent re-
striction from the 32-month moratorium in contention.  Id. at 
306.  From the beginning the restriction was temporary, with a 
start date and – although unspecified at the outset – a finite end 
to the development prohibition.  Id.  Accordingly, the Court found 
the landowners had been deprived economic use of their property 
for only a finite and temporary period of time, and therefore re-
tained a future interest.  Id. at 311.  Although the future interests 
were diminished in value, they nevertheless remained intact, 
which the Court found dispositive in finding no taking of the parcel 
as a whole.  Id. at 317 n.13. 
Unlike Tahoe-Sierra, the regulations imposed on the Cordelia 
lot restrict all economically beneficial use of the parcel as a whole, 
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not merely a temporal segment.  535 U.S. at 332.  Here, like in Lu-
cas, the restrictions on the Cordelia Lot do not include a termina-
tion date or a condition upon which the ability to develop would be 
reinstated.  505 U.S. at 1010-11.  Defendants argue that a hypo-
thetical future in which the Cordelia Lot could become developable 
leads to the conclusion that Cordelia retains a future economically 
beneficial use of the land.  As the regulations stand, there is no 
other way to read the permit denial than as permanent.  See Whit-
ney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1172-73 (holding that taking accrued 
when statute was enacted).  Only in retrospect could the present 
regulations be read as temporary.  See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 
329-30. 
Defendant’s logic would render Lucas and the entire class of 
categorical regulatory takings inapplicable to virtually any set of 
facts.  A regulation, no matter how permanent it may presently 
seem, can always be amended or rescinded.  See Hendler v. United 
States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed.Cir. 1991).  All takings are in fact 
temporary, whether the interest taken is “a possessory estate for 
years or a fee simple acquired through condemnation, or an ease-
ment of use by virtue of a regulation.”  Id.  Moreover, “[n]othing in 
the Just Compensation Clause suggests that ‘takings’ must be per-
manent and irrevocable.”  San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 657 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).  When a would be permanent taking is cut 
short, it does not change what was previously taken.  See Seiber v. 
United States, 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2002); Caldwell v. United 
States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (noting that whether a 
takings claim is temporary or permanent may be unknown when 
it accrues). 
The Tahoe-Sierra decision was limited in scope to circum-
stances where an end point was discernable and definite, and can-
not be extended to include hypothetical scenarios.  See Seiber, 364 
F.3d at 1368 (noting that Tahoe-Sierra may only reject a per se 
taking for “temporary development moratoria” and not regulations 
that are temporary only because they were changed); Boise Cas-
cade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350-52 (Fed.Cir. 2002) 
(noting that Tahoe-Sierra only rejected categorical taking for tem-
porary moratoria).  Therefore, the Court should appropriately de-
termine that Plaintiff suffered a loss of all economically beneficial 
use of her land based on the presently discernible future.  See First 
English, 482 U.S. at 320. 
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1. The distinction between temporary and 
permanent takings is irrelevant when a 
landowner is deprived of all economically 
beneficial use of their land 
The facts of this case present restrictions that are permanent 
by their own text as applied to the Cordelia Lot.  See Tahoe-Sierra, 
535 U.S. at 329-30.  However, even read as temporary there would 
be no distinction because Cordelia has no economically beneficial 
use remaining.  First English, 482 U.S. at 318.  Nowhere in the 
Takings Clause is there a distinction between permanent takings 
and temporary takings; indeed, First English upholds that “tempo-
rary takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his prop-
erty, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which 
the constitution clearly requires compensation.”  482 U.S. at 318. 
Furthermore, the effect of a regulatory taking that deprives an 
owner of all use is “the equivalent of a physical appropriation,” for 
which the only remedy is just compensation.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1017.  The only appropriate calculation in the present case is to 
determine just compensation owed for the complete deprivation of 
Cordelia’s property, and the simple prospect of the restrictions be-
ing lifted in the future cannot factor into the Court’s decision.  See 
First English, 482 U.S. at 318-20. 
V. ECONOMIC USE IS THE APPROPRIATE TEST, 
AND A TOKEN RETENTION OF VALUE OR 
REVENUE RESULTING IN ECONOMIC LOSS 
DOES NOT RENDER CATEGORICAL 
TREATMENT INAPPOSITE 
A property owner left without any economically viable use of 
their land has been subjected to a loss analogous to that of a phys-
ical taking, constituting a per se categorical taking.  Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1017 (citing San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 652 (dissenting 
opinion)).  ”[F]or what is the land but the profits thereof[?]”  Id. 
(citing E. Coke, Institutes, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. Ed. 1812).  A lack of 
beneficial economic use, not whether any land value or revenue 
source remains, determines categorical treatment.  Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1015; see also Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States, 
231 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Florida Rock Industries, Inc. 
v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 895-97 (Fed.Cir. 1986). 
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A. Economic Use is the Determinative Factor for a 
Categorical Takings Claim 
The majority opinion of the Lucas court articulated that uses 
of the land were critical in the analysis of categorical regulatory 
takings.  505 U.S. at 1019.  Prior history of takings litigation shows 
“an abiding concern for the productive use of, and economic invest-
ment in, land.”  Id. at n.8.  In fact, the Court in Lucas focuses their 
inquiry on the remaining economically viable use of the property 
without ever requiring that the land be truly valueless.  See id. at 
1026-28.  The Court reiterates that physical appropriations, no 
matter how insignificant or how great the public interest, must be 
justly compensated.  Id. at 1029 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)).  In comparing 
land rendered useless through regulation to that of a physical ap-
propriation, Lucas stated “[w]e believe similar treatment must be 
accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all 
economically beneficial use of land.”  Id. at 1029 (emphasis added). 
Similar analysis in the Federal Circuit affirms the proposition 
that a lack of economically beneficial use is the crux of a categorical 
takings claim.  See Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 1365.  In Palm Beach, 
the plaintiff asserted a categorical takings claim based on denial of 
a wetlands permit.  Id. at 1364.  The Court discussed the analysis 
of this type of claim as requiring “sufficient denial of economically 
viable use,” reasoning that when an owner is left with no rights 
“except bare legal title” the government must pay for the property 
interest taken.  Id. at 1363.  The appropriate inquiry in the present 
case is therefore whether Cordelia was deprived of economically 
beneficial use of the property.  See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017. 
After being denied the necessary permits to alter her property 
in any way, Cordelia possesses nothing more than empty title to a 
piece of land.  R. at 6.  The combined restrictions effectively confis-
cate the land from Cordelia, placing it on equal footing with that of 
a physical appropriation.  See id. at 1029; R. at 6 (FWS May 15, 
2016 letter confirming that “any disturbance” to Cordelia’s prop-
erty aside from annual mowing “would constitute a ‘take’ of the 
Karner Blues.”). 
In contrast to the application of economically beneficial use in 
categorical takings is the finding of a reduction in value.  When a 
future economically beneficial use remains intact such as that of a 
temporary moratorium set to expire, only a diminution in value 
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has occurred, and not a denial of all economically beneficial 
use.  See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 317.  Thus, the proper reading 
of Tahoe-Sierra limits the Court’s holding to whether the value of 
future economically beneficial use, if any exists, can be considered 
when evaluating a categorical takings claim.  See id.  The Court 
unsurprisingly found a future interest existed, and therefore cate-
gorical treatment was inappropriate.  Id. at 330-32.  However, Ta-
hoe-Sierra affirmed the application of Lucas to instances when “no 
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.”  Id. 
at 330 (emphasis in original).  As applied to the restrictions on the 
Cordelia Lot, it would be a mischaracterization of Tahoe-Sierra to 
use a ‘no remaining value’ standard rather than ‘no remaining ben-
eficial use.’  Id. 329-32. 
B. Courts Cannot Use Token Interests Remaining in 
Land or Nominal Revenue Resulting in a Net Loss 
to Avoid the Duty to Compensate 
Although value remains an important part of the calculation 
in takings claims, its usefulness is only in determining the amount 
of compensation to be paid.  Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 1363-
64.  Property does not need to be rendered valueless in order to 
proceed with a categorical takings claim.  Resources Investments 
Inc., 85 Fed.Cl. at 488; see Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.  Courts have 
rejected assertions that merely because a property retains a token 
interest – as all property arguably does to some degree – categori-
cal treatment is no longer an available option.  See Lucas, 505 U.S. 
at 1044; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.  FWS and the County cannot 
escape the requirement to provide just compensation in reliance on 
remaining value in the land itself, regardless of the form, so long 
as there is no economically beneficial use that remains.  Palazzolo, 
533 U.S. at 631. 
Reliance on Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer of pay-
ment to assert an economically beneficial use exists is unfounded 
and misleading at best.  In the strictest sense, a yearly revenue of 
$1,000 is economic in nature, however Defendant’s misrepresent 
judicial interpretation of economically beneficial use.  It is true 
that economically beneficial use does not mean only an ideal use, 
or the most profitable use.  See id. at 632.  For example, Palazzolo 
found a landowner that retained the ability to construct a substan-
tial residence was not deprived of all economically beneficial use, 
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despite aspirations to develop on a much larger scale.  Id. at 
631.  However, when a proposed land use that generates revenue 
actually results in an overall net loss, the use cannot be economi-
cally beneficial.  Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 37, 48-49 
(1994) (finding that allegedly profitable uses incapable of paying 
property taxes are not economically viable). 
In the present case, the mere existence of an offer does not jus-
tify finding a per se economically beneficial use.  Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has observed that takings jurisprudence “is charac-
terized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’” designed to 
carefully examine the relevant circumstances.  Tahoe-Sierra, 535 
U.S. at 322 (quoting Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 124).  Examining 
the circumstances of this case elucidates the incongruity of Defend-
ant’s assertion with logic; namely that an offer amounting to less 
than the property tax constitutes economic value.  See Bowles, 31 
Fed.Cl. at 48-49; R. at 7.  At the bare minimum, without even cov-
ering the property taxes of the Cordelia Lot the Brittain County 
Butterfly Society’s offer does not reject Cordelia’s categorical tak-
ings claim.  Bowles, 31 Fed.Cl. at 48-49. 
Furthermore, no other economically beneficial uses have been 
identified – a burden that falls on the Defendants.  Resources In-
vestments, 85 Fed.Cl. at 490.  Any proposed uses must show a rea-
sonable probability that “the land [is] both physically adaptable for 
such use and that there is a need or demand for such use in the 
reasonably near future.”  Board of Cty. Supervisors of Prince Wil-
liam Cty. VA, 276 F.3d at 1365.  Nothing in the record suggests 
any viable uses for the Cordelia Lot exist.  R. at 7.  To the contrary, 
FWS has informed Cordelia that “any disturbance” whatsoever to 
the entire ten acres would constitute a “take” in violation of the 
ESA.  16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(B).  Consequently, Cordelia’s takings 
claim based on a complete deprivation of economic use is not pre-
cluded. 
VI. PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES DO NOT 
PRECLUDE CORDELIA LEAR’S TAKINGS CLAIM 
The public trust doctrine does not impede Cordelia’s takings 
claim because it does not apply to lands granted by Congress prior 
to a state’s admission to the Union.  The public trust doctrine lim-
its private uses of lands beneath navigable waterways held by the 
sovereign states.  See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
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436-37 (1892).  However, in 1803 the U.S. Federal Government 
granted the fee simple interest in Lear Island and the surrounding 
submerged lands to the Lear family, predating statehood and nul-
lifying any State or County public trust authority over the sub-
merged lands of the Lear Island grant.  Without authority under a 
public trust theory, Brittain County must compensate Cordelia for 
depriving her of the use of her property. 
A. The Lear Island Grant Is Not Subject to the Public 
Trust Doctrine Because It is Not Under the 
Sovereign Authority of New Union 
1. Sovereignty is the fundamental basis of the 
public trust doctrine 
The right of the states to regulate submerged lands under the 
public trust doctrine flows from the transfer of sovereignty to state 
governments from their predecessor sovereign.  In their 1842 deci-
sion in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, the Supreme Court established 
for the original thirteen states an “absolute right to all their navi-
gable waters and the soils under them.”  41 U.S. 367, 410 
(1842).  The Court in Martin traced this sovereign right to “princi-
ples of national law,” whereby sovereigns of all nations have pre-
sumptive authority to control or dispose of lands in their posses-
sion.  Id.at 393.  In the treaty concluding the Revolutionary War, 
the King of England ceded his sovereignty over the Thirteen Colo-
nies to the new United States government.  Id. at 394.  The colo-
nies became states, and the states assumed the role of sovereign 
over their respective lands2, subject only to such rights as were 
constitutionally surrendered to the Federal Govern-
ment.  Id. at  410. 
When the United States acquired new territories, the Federal 
Government assumed “the entire dominion and sovereignty” over 
those lands “so long as they remain[ed] in a territorial condi-
tion.”  Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1892).  As new states were 
organized and admitted to the Union, each new state succeeded the 
 
2. The sovereignty of state governments is delegated to them by their citizens 
through the political process, thus any reference to state sovereignty incorporates 
the collective sovereignty of “the People” as established in the U.S. Constitution.  
See U.S. Const. preamble.  
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U.S. as sovereign over lands held in trust for the public within 
state borders, putting new states on “equal footing” with the origi-
nal thirteen as coequal sovereigns.  See id. at 49; 57-58.  Thus, 
when a portion of the Northwest Territory was organized as the 
State of New Union, the U.S. Government conferred sovereign 
rights on the State along with title to public lands therein, to hold 
in trust for the benefit of the public. 
2. The predecessor sovereign’s grant of Lear 
Island and its submerged lands precludes the 
successor sovereign’s claim of public trust 
authority 
While holding the Territories as sovereign, the U.S. had “the 
power to make grants of lands below high water mark of navigable 
waters.”  Shively, 152 U.S. at 48.  In 1953, Congress expressly ex-
empted such grants from the public trust in the Submerged Lands 
Act of 1953 (SLA).  43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (2012).  The SLA de-
fines “lands beneath navigable waters” as all lands within state 
borders covered by tidal or nontidal waters.  Id. § 1301(a)(1) (de-
scribing nontidal waters navigable at the time of admis-
sion); id. § 1301(a)(2) (regarding tidelands and coastal 
zones).  However, the SLA goes on to specifically exclude from that 
designation any submerged lands “lawfully patented and conveyed 
by the United States.”  Id. § 1301(f).  Thus, the sovereign right of 
states to control the use and disposition of lands beneath navigable 
waters is restricted by any allodial rights granted by the U.S. prior 
to statehood; “such rights are not cut off by the subsequent creation 
of the state, but remain unimpaired[.]”  U.S. v. Holt State Bank, 
270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926) (collecting cases affirming the Federal 
Government’s sovereign right to alienate submerged Territorial 
lands prior to a state’s admission to the Union) (emphasis added). 
There is no factual or legal basis under a public trust theory to 
support Brittain County’s denial of liability for a taking.  In 1803, 
the United States Congress granted Lear Island and its surround-
ing submerged lands in fee simple absolute to Cornelius Lear.  R. 
at 4.  At the time, Lear Island and present-day New Union were 
part of the Northwest Territory, thus under the sovereign author-
ity of the Federal Government.  Id.; see Shively, 152 U.S. at 
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48.  New Union was eventually admitted as a state3 and was 
granted sovereignty over Federal lands under the “equal footing” 
doctrine.  See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58; R. at 4.  However, because 
the submerged lands of the Grant were granted to Cornelius Lear 
before statehood, those lands were not conveyed to New Union 
upon admission and are not considered “lands beneath navigable 
waters” under the SLA.  R. at 4; 43 U.S.C. § 1301(f) (2012).  Thus, 
the County has no sovereign authority over those lands and cannot 
freely regulate them under the public trust doctrine. 
B. Without Regulatory Authority Under the Public 
Trust Doctrine, Brittain County’s Wetland 
Preservation Law Constitutes a Complete 
Deprivation of the Beneficial Use of Cordelia 
Lear’s Submerged Lands 
Cordelia is entitled to the sole use and occupancy of the wet-
lands between the lateral boundaries of the Cordelia Lot, and dep-
rivation of that use constitutes a taking.  Fee title to the Grant was 
passed down through generations of the Lear family, resting in 
1965 with King James Lear.  R. at 5.  When King Lear subdivided 
the island and deeded the subject property to Cordelia, she ac-
quired an indefeasible vested remainder in the fee simple title to 
the Cordelia Lot.  Id.; Restatement (First) of Property § 157, cmt. 
h (Am Law Inst. 1936).4  Her father’s death in 2005 vested Cordelia 
 
3. The Record does not indicate when New Union was admitted as a state.  
This factual omission would be a source of contention if the parties had to argue 
the issue of whether the Cove constituted “navigable waters” under a presumption 
of New Union’s sovereign public trust authority.  The statutory definition of 
“lands beneath navigable waters” looks to whether a waterway was navigable at 
the time a state enters the Union.  43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (2012).  The past use of 
the Cove as a boat landing might spur the Government to argue that those waters 
were navigable in fact when New Union was admitted.  R. at 5.  Without knowing 
the date of New Union’s admission or the range of dates during which the Cove 
was “historically” used for landing, it would be difficult to construct a timeline 
either supporting or debunking such an argument.  Fortunately, the Court is re-
lieved of the need to adjudicate that issue, as the record furnishes other facts with 
enough specificity to render the Government’s public trust theory moot, as dis-
cussed supra. p. 28. 
4. Comment h in the Restatement (First) of Property reads in relevant part: 
“When an otherwise effective conveyance [in this case, the Cordelia Lot deed as 
conveyed to Cordelia in 1965] of. . .land. . .creates one or more prior interests 
[King James Lear’s reserved life estate],. . .and provides. . .that upon the expira-
tion of such prior limited interest [the 2005 death of King Lear], the ownership in 
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with full title to her lot in fee simple absolute.  Because the subdi-
vision of the island did not include the deeded submerged lands, 
and because the record does not indicate that King Lear disposed 
of the entire submerged lands of the Grant in a will or other devise, 
we must assume that Cordelia inherited an equal share of any in-
testate submerged lands as a tenant in common with her sis-
ters.  26B C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 36 (collecting cases 
holding that the property of an unmarried intestate descends to his 
or her children in equal shares); Cahaba Forests, LLC v. Hay, 927 
F.Supp.2d 1273, 1281 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (extending the Alabama Su-
preme Court’s holding that heirs of an intestate become tenants in 
common with undivided interests).   
However, her riparian right to use and occupy submerged 
lands is limited to the portion that abuts her littoral estate.  See 
Houston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 569 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(holding that riparian rights of a littoral landowner extend later-
ally only to the property line of the adjacent littoral land-
owner).  Thus, even if Cordelia may be presumed to hold an undi-
vided one-third ownership interest in the intestate submerged 
lands, her beneficial use of any submerged lands is limited to the 
Cove. 
VII. FWS AND BRITTAIN COUNTY ARE JOINTLY 
LIABLE FOR A TOTAL TAKING BECAUSE THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS 
COMPENSATION FOR THE COMPLETE 
DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking of 
private property by the U.S. Government, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment extends that prohibition to the states.  U.S. Const. 
amend. V, XIV § 1; e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Flor-
ida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010) 
(holding that the Takings Clause – as applied against the states – 
prohibits the states from taking either riparian rights or real prop-
erty without just compensation).  Thus, the federal and state gov-
ernments – and by extension, counties – are mutually obliged by 
 
fee simple absolute of the land. . .shall belong to a person who is presently identi-
fiable [Cordelia Lear, as named on the deed of 1965], such person has an indefea-
sibly vested remainder.” 
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Constitutional mandate to compensate private landowners for tak-
ings, and the Federal Courts must check any governmental dere-
liction of that obligation. 
A. Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence Has 
Consistently Upheld the Fifth Amendment 
Prohibition on Uncompensated Deprivation of 
Property Rights 
Regulatory takings case law reflects a commitment to effectu-
ate judicial standards consistent with Constitutional protections of 
private property rights.  The U.S. Supreme Court first enunciated 
the regulatory takings doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon.  260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  Governments may regulate private 
property to a certain point without compensation, but if regulation 
goes “too far,” it is recognized as a taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment.  Id.  Thus, if a state or local government exercises its police 
power to regulate private property, or if the Federal Government 
imposes restrictions on property through a proper exercise of its 
Commerce power, the Fifth Amendment and Due Process Clause 
require that such regulation does not result in the destruction of 
the landowner’s Constitutional rights.  See id. at 413-14.   
The Takings Clause bars governments from “forcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 
617-18 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 36 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) 
(holding that a “fair interpretation” of the Takings Clause requires 
compensation of landowners for losses when the inverse benefits of 
those losses accrue to the public)).  The principles of “fairness” and 
“justice,” though not expressly in the Fifth Amendment, are the 
governing policy standards for judicial interpretation of the Tak-
ings Clause. 
B. Losses Incurred by Private Landowners Are the 
Fundamental Consideration in Determining Fifth 
Amendment Liability 
Regulatory takings analysis centers squarely on the private 
landowner’s losses and deprivation of rights in their prop-
erty.  Even where the Supreme Court has held that a regulatory 
taking did not occur, that conclusion relies on an assessment of the 
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degree to which the value of the ownership interest is dimin-
ished.  Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 419.  In the words of Justice William 
O. Douglas, “[i]t is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, which is 
the measure of the value of the property taken.”  U.S. v. Causby, 
328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).  The Supreme Court’s Keystone Bitumi-
nous test for regulatory takings compares “the value that has been 
taken” and “the value that remains.”  480 U.S. at 497.  Thus, in the 
regulatory takings “fraction,” wherein the “relevant parcel” fur-
nishes the “denominator,” the degree to which the owner’s property 
rights are infringed supplies the “numerator.”  Id.  Put another 
way, the landowner’s loss – and destruction of the right to enjoy 
and use the land – is the determinative value in the analysis.  See 
id.  Whether a taking has occurred has nothing to do with the so-
cial value of the regulatory mechanisms by which that loss is im-
posed.  See id. 
Regulations will result in a compensable taking if they cate-
gorically deny a landowner’s use of her land, regardless of any pub-
lic benefits that may accrue from regulations, or the public nui-
sances or harms that the regulations may prevent.  See Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1026.  As Justice Scalia points out, the distinction between 
compensable takings and mere deprivations not requiring compen-
sation would be “difficult, if not impossible to discern” if based on 
the government’s justifications for regulation rather than losses in-
curred in fact by the landowner.  Id.  Such losses are the only 
measurable indicia by which a deprivation of property interests 
can be consistently evaluated from case to case.  Id.  Thus, the cal-
culation for determining whether a total regulatory taking has oc-
curred is decidedly landowner-centric. 
C. Faithful Application of Established Fifth 
Amendment and Regulatory Takings Precedent 
Compels a Finding of Joint FWS and County 
Liability 
When adjudicating a regulatory takings claim, the courts must 
first determine if a property owner has been left without economi-
cally viable use of the property.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.  Courts 
will only proceed to the next element of the applicable test when it 
has been decided whether the loss incurred by the landowner as a 
result of the land use restrictions constitutes either a Lucas per se 
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categorical taking or a Penn. Central partial regulatory tak-
ing.  See Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 1363-64.  If a Penn. Central par-
tial taking is found to have accrued, a court will next consider “the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations.”  438 U.S. at 124.  However, if the land 
use restrictions are found to deny the landowner all economically 
viable use of the property, a Lucas categorical taking has occurred, 
and at that point the nature of the land use restrictions may be 
considered as part of the calculus to fix the extent of monetary 
damages.  Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 1363.  Upon a finding of a total 
regulatory taking, the issue of investment-backed expectations be-
comes moot, and “both law and sound constitutional policy entitle 
the owner to just compensation.”  Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).  In 
other words, the causes of a total loss will only be examined after 
it is found that a loss has occurred.  By that point, because the loss 
has occurred, the landowner is entitled to just compensation re-
gardless of which or how many agencies have caused the loss.  The 
Fifth Amendment expressly prohibits uncompensated takings; it 
does not limit the range of potentially liable takers. 
In the present case, the Federal regulation prohibiting dis-
turbance of the Karner Blue’s habitat and the County Wetlands 
Preservation Law prohibiting development of the Cove combine to 
deprive Cordelia Lear of all economically beneficial use of both the 
ten-acre Cordelia Lot and the developable riparian lands in which 
Cordelia owns a right of use and occupancy.  See R. at 6, 7.  Be-
cause the restrictions completely deprive Cordelia of the beneficial 
use of her property, a categorical taking has occurred.  Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1026.  The next step in a categorical takings analysis is to 
determine the monetary damages sufficient to meet the Fifth 
Amendment mandate of just compensation.5  Palm Beach, 231 
F.3d at 1363.  The amount of compensation is measured by the 
property’s fair market value, although the nature of the use re-
strictions may be considered as a factor in determining government 
liability.  Id.  However, because the restrictions in this case create 
 
5. An assessment of the owner’s expectations regarding future use would 
only be relevant in determining what portion of the property had been encum-
bered by the restrictions if a partial taking were found to have been imposed.  
Palm Beach, 231 F.2d at 1363-64.  Because Cordelia has suffered a categorical 
taking, any argument based on the applicability of a Penn. Central partial regu-
latory takings test must fail. 
31
  
2017] BEST BRIEF: CORDELIA LEAR 169 
a blanket prohibition on any development or other economically vi-
able use, Cordelia is entitled to the fair market value of her prop-
erty. 
A review of federal Fifth Amendment case law yields no prec-
edent barring the joint liability of a federal and county agency for 
a total regulatory taking.  Neither does it unearth any precedent 
to the contrary.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide 
unequivocally for just compensation when private property is 
taken by the Federal and State Governments.  U.S. Const. amend. 
V, XIV § 1; e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617.  The states, in turn, 
delegate their police power to local governments, typically by way 
of legislative grant.  1 Local Govt. Law § 2:6.  Accordingly, FWS 
and Brittain County share a mutual obligation to abide by the lim-
its on government power specified in the U.S. Bill of Rights.  Citi-
zens of the County, as citizens of the State, are also citizens of the 
United States, and therefore equally protected under the Fifth 
Amendment from uncompensated takings on the part of any gov-
ernment agency: federal, state, and local.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV 
§1.  Citizen rights, and the government obligation to protect them, 
operate at all levels of the federalist system. 
This case presents a unique opportunity for this Court to set a 
precedent that establishes a common law protection of Fifth 
Amendment rights against aggregated regulatory takings.  The al-
ternative – to hold that two restrictions that are separate partial 
takings do not require compensation despite effectuating in fact a 
total taking – would invite potential agency collusion and abuses 
of the Fifth Amendment.  Such a rule could be interpreted as judi-
cial acquiescence to government windfalls resulting from strategic 
regulation by multiple agencies.  Hence, in the interests of justice 
and fairness, this Court should find FWS and Brittain County 
jointly liable for the total taking of Cordelia Lear’s property. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court 
to reverse the district court’s determination on the following point 
and instead find that: ESA protection of an intrastate population 
of the Karner Blue butterfly is not a valid exercise of FWSs regu-
latory authority under the Commerce Clause.  Plaintiff further 
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asks the court to affirm the district court’s rulings that: (1) Plain-
tiff’s takings claim is ripe because requiring her to pursue an ITP 
would constitute an undue burden; (2) the Cordelia Lot, rather 
than the entirety of Lear Island, is the relevant parcel for a takings 
analysis; (3) the suggestion that the property may become develop-
able upon the natural destruction of the Karner Blue in ten 
years does not bar Plaintiff’s takings claim of a complete depriva-
tion of economic value; (4) the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s 
offer to pay $1,000 per year in rent does not preclude Plaintiff’s 
taking claim of a complete loss of economic value; (5) public trust 
principles do not inhere in Plaintiff’s title because the public trust 
does not include lands Congressionally granted before statehood; 
and (6) FWS and Brittain County are jointly liable for a complete 
deprivation of economic value of the Cordelia Lot under a fair and 
just interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 
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